SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ARBITRATION AND AWARD-SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
PUBLIC SECTOR ARBITRATION LIMITED TO DETERMINING

WHETHER ARBITRATOR'S INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT IS
REASONABLY DEBATABLE -Kearny P.B.A. Local 21 v. Town of
Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 405 A.2d 393 (1979).
A conflict arose between the Kearny P.B.A. Local 21 (PBA) and
the Town of Kearny due to differing interpretations of a collective
bargaining agreement. The dispute resulted from a strike by Kearny
municipal employees on October 11, 1976. When the strike was
called, the chief of police directed officers "to remain on a standby
basis until further notice, and . . . not to leave the Town of Kearny."

81 N.J. at 208, 212, 405 A.2d at 395.
The PBA argued that officers who had remained on standby were
entitled to overtime compensation. When the Town refused to pay
for overtime, the PBA demanded arbitration. At a hearing, Kearny
argued that the police chief's directive had not required the police to
report for duty and compensation was therefore unwarranted. Furthermore, the PBA had unsuccessfully negotiated for an express standby
provision during previous contract negotiations. The Town argued
that the PBA could not win through arbitration issues which had already been negotiated and denied. Id. at 213, 405 A.2d at 395.
The arbitrator found for the PBA. He reasoned that an employee
should be compensated for hours worked beyond those agreed upon
in contract and that, once the police chief mandated that officers were
not to leave town, the officers were on duty. In addition, the arbitrator ruled that the PBA's failure to obtain an express standby provision during negotiations was inconsequential. The standby provision
sought during bargaining would have provided compensation when
employees were on standby "at home." The standby order involved
in the instant case was viewed as more restrictive since, by prohibiting police officers from leaving town, a number of non-residents were
unable to return to their homes during the strike. Id. at 213-14, 405
A.2d at 396.
The trial court affirmed the award. Id. at 212, 405 A.2d at 395.
However, the appellate division modified the opinion, and granted
overtime pay only to those officers residing outside of Kearny. 159
N.J. Super. 402, 388 A.2d 265 (App. Div. 1978). The appellate division opinion pointed to an apparent inconsistency in the arbitrator's
opinion. The arbitrator assumed that police would not deserve compensation if they had been ordered to standby at home, since this
provision had been defeated during bargaining. Yet, the arbitrator
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ruled that police who resided in Kearny were entitled to pay under
the less restrictive condition that they remain within the Town's borders. On the other hand, non-residents were also required by the
directive to remain in Kearny. This was a more severe limitation than
being cotifined to one's home outside of Kearny. Therefore, the court
affirmed the award for non-resident police but struck down the payment to residents, in accordance with the arbitrator's apparent intent
to compensate for standby served under more restrictive conditions
than those of the proposed contract. 81 N.J. at 208, 215, 405 A.2d at
396.
The New Jersey supreme court reinstated the trial court's opinion, concluding that, "[a]n arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside
lightly." Id. at 221, 405 A.2d at 399. The court distinguished public
and private sector arbitration. In public employment, an arbitrator's
judgment must conform to the public interest and welfare. His determination must also meet relevant statutory standards. Id. at 215,
405 A.2d at 397. However, despite this higher standard for public
arbitration, the evidence was insufficient in this case to show that the
arbitrator acted contrary to the public welfare. "In that event . . . the
scope of judicial review is limited to determining whether or not the
interpretation of the contractual language is reasonably debatable."
Id. at 221, 405 A.2d at 399-400. If the interpretation is subject to
reasonable debate, the courts should defer to the arbitrator's award.
Applying this standard, the court upheld the award. Id.
This opinion affirms the tradition of limited judicial review of
public sector arbitration. This tradition had been gradually eroded. In
rejecting a more expansive standard of review, this court clarifies the
roles of arbitrators and the courts.
AGENCY-PHYSICIANS
HAS

RIGHT

TO

AND

SURGEONS-PATIENT

ASSUME

RENDERED BY ATTENDING

THAT

OF HOSPITAL

NEGLIGENT

TREATMENT
PHYSICIANS RENDERS HOSPITAL

LIABLE ABSENT NOTICE TO CONTRARY-Arthur v. St. Peters
Hospital, 169 N.J. Super. 575, 405 A.2d 443 (Law Div. 1979).

On February 6, 1976, Keith Arthur sought treatment at the
emergency room of St. Peters Hospital in New Brunswick for an injury to his left wrist. After x-rays were taken, he was told that there
were no fractures and he was then released. Over a period of several
months thereafter, he felt continuous pain in his wrist and it remained swollen. He subsequently consulted another physician who
discovered a bone fracture. Arthur initiated a medical malpractice suit
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against St. Peters and all the doctors, nurses, and aides who participated in his treatment. 169 N.J. Super. at 577-78, 405 A.2d at 444.
St. Peters moved for summary judgment, arguing that whatever
negligence existed was that of the individual physicians involved, who
were independent contractors. Arthur asserted that the contractual
status of the physicians was a fact question and, in any event, the
doctors were held out to be employees of St. Peters and, thus, the
hospital was responsible under the doctrine of apparent authority. Id.
at 577, 405 A.2d at 444. The hospital submitted an affidavit with its
motion, stating that the physicians involved in Arthur's diagnosis
were all independent contractors. As evidence of the doctors' status,
the hospital noted that no deductions for withholding or social security were taken from the compensation that the doctors received. Id.
at 578, 405 A.2d at 444.
In holding that the hospital was not entitled to summary judgment, Judge Gibson first stated that the absence of deductions was
not a conclusive indication of a lack of contractual relationship.
Rather, "[i]n determining employment status in New Jersey, it is the
'degree of control' which is critical." Id. However, Judge Gibson's
determination on the issue of apparent authority made the independent contractor issue moot.
Judge Gibson defined apparent authority as "impos[ing] liability
not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship but rather
because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority
exists." Id. at 580, 405 A.2d at 446. This is basically an estoppel concept, and neither a principal-agent relationship, nor a contract, is a
prerequisite to application of the doctrine. See Hill v. Newman, 126
N.J. Super. 557, 316 A.2d 8 (App. Div. 1973), certif. denied, 64 N.J.
508, 317 A.2d 720 (1974). Judge Gibson stated that, whenever a hospital holds out a physician as its employee and a patient has relied
upon the physician's apparent status as an employee, then the hospital will be liable for the physician's negligence. 169 N.J. Super. at
581, 405 A.2d at 446.
In addition to citing several cases from other jurisdictions to support his determination, the judge recognized that the court could take
judicial notice that, generally, people who seek medical help through
the emergency room do not realize that the physicians who are treating them may not be employees of the hospital. The patients in such
situations usually rely upon the reputation of the hospital. The judge
also commented that the only evidence relating to notice that was
supplied in support of the motion for summary judgment was the
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hospital reports and bill. On these documents there was no indication
that the physicians were working independently of the hospital.
On the basis of the above, Judge Gibson concluded that "[a]t the
very least, a factual question is presented." Id. at 583, 405 A.2d at
447. The judge denied the hospital's motion for summary judgment.
The decision in Arthur is sound for it only denies to hospitals the
power to automatically escape liability when there is a factual question
of whether its physicians have the apparent authority to act.
CHILD CUSTODY-SPOUSE'S

HOMOSEXUALITY NOT GROUNDS FOR

CHANGE OF CUSTODY-M.P.

v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 404

A.2d 1256 (App. Div. 1979).
In this case, the appellate division was faced with the difficult
question of the weight to be given to a parent's sexual orientation as a
factor in determining that parent's fitness to retain custody of her
children after a divorce. S.P., the defendant, was an admitted practicing homosexual who had been awarded custody of her two children,
both female, when she was divorced in 1969. 169 N.J. Super. at
426-27, 404 A.2d at 1257.
In 1975, M.P., the children's father, brought an action to have
custody transferred to him on the grounds that the defendant was "an
unfit mother." After a series of hearings, the trial judge awarded custody to the father and the mother appealed. Id.
On appeal, the mother argued that the trial court's decision was
based solely upon the fact of her homosexuality and could not be
legally sustained. The father conceded that the mother's homosexuality alone was not a legally sufficient basis for denying custody, id. at
427, 404 A.2d at 1257, but argued that changed circumstances indicated that the interests of the children would be served best by
awarding custody to him. Id. at 428, 404 A.2d at 1258.
The appellate division first noted its agreement that homosexuality alone would not disqualify a parent from retaining custody. Id. at
427, 404 A.2d at 1257. After stating that in awarding custody, the
best interests of the children were of primary concern, and that the
party seeking to modify custody bore the burden of showing sufficient
changed circumstances to require modification, id. at 431, 404 A.2d
at 1259, the court found that the plaintiff-father had not met that
burden and that the trial court had made no findings as to changed
circumstances. Rather, Judge Antell, writing for a two judge majority,
found that custody had been taken from the mother for the sole
reason that she was a homosexual and without regard for the welfare
of the children. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 1260.
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On analyzing the facts in the record, the court found specifically
that S.P. was a warm, attentive mother who had "done all that can be
expected of a dutiful mother," id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 1258, and that
there was no evidence that S.P. had engaged in any sexual misconduct, attempted to inculcate the children with her sexual attitude, or
displayed any sexual behavior in front of the children.
On the other hand, the court found that the father had originally
denied paternity of one of the children, had not been timely in paying for the children's support, id. at 430, 404 A.2d at 1260, and that
his sexual behavior was "so far out of the ordinary as to create the
most acute anxieties about entrusting so troubled and deviant a personality with the responsibility of creating an environment for the
upbringing of two young girls." Id. at 438, 404 A.2d at 1263.
These facts clearly indicated to the court that the children's interests would be best served by their continuing in the custody of
their mother. Id. at 439, 404 A.2d at 1263. To end the mother's custody, Judge Antell believed, would instill in the children a sense of
shame, and would diminish "their regard for the rule of human behavior, everywhere accepted, that we do not forsake those to whom
we are indebted for love and nurture merely because they are held in
low esteem by others." Id. at 438-39, 404 A.2d at 1263.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Ard maintained that the majority
erred by making its own findings of fact, thereby usurping the functions of the trial judge. Id. at 444, 404 A.2d at 1266. The question
presented for appellate review was "not the determination of a
homosexual parent's rights but rather, giving the trial judge's opinion
the great weight it deserves, whether [the trial court's] judgment
should be disturbed." Id. Because he found sufficient evidence in the
record to support the trial judge's finding, Judge Ard would have
affirmed the decision. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 1265.
The significance of this decision can be found in its treatment of
a parent's sexual orientation as only one element to be considered in
a custody decision. Homosexuality would be a relevant factor only
where there is clear proof that the children would be appreciably
harmed by being placed in the custody of the homosexual parent.
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LAW AND PROCEDURE-NEW JERSEY
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DOES NOT INTEND TO USE SUCH MATERIAL AT

TaAL-State v.

Williams, 80 N.J. 472, 404 A.2d 34 (1979).
Samuel Lee Williams was convicted of three felonies arising from
the armed robbery of an Army-Navy store in Elizabeth, N.J., on
March 22, 1976. The store's owner, Mrs. Santullo, was alone in the
store when the defendant entered. He brandished a knife, robbed
Mrs. Santullo, and then stabbed her in the neck and chest as she
knelt and prayed. Williams was arrested and charged with the crime
two months later. 80 N.J. at 476, 404 A.2d at 36.
Prior to trial, Williams' attorney interviewed Mrs. Santullo twice.
On the second occasion, he showed Mrs. Santullo three photographs,
and Mrs. Santullo identified Williams' picture. Subsequently,. the
prosecution moved for reciprocal discovery of the photographs and of
the memoranda of the interviews. Despite defense counsel's protestations that he did not intend to produce this material at trial, the court
granted the motion. At trial, the State introduced the photograph
which Mrs. Santullo identified as that of Williams. The prosecutor
emphasized that the defendant's own attorney had shown Mrs.
Santullo-the photograph. Subsequently, the jury found Williams
guilty. Id.
The appellate division reversed the trial court's decision, holding
that the discovery rule, N.J.R. 3:13-3, did not extend to material in
defense counsel's possession which the defense did not plan to introduce at trial. Id. at 475, 404 A.2d at 36.
The New Jersey supreme court affirmed, concluding that the
trial court had extended the reciprocal discovery provisions too far,
thereby violating Williams' right to effective assistance of counsel. Id.
at 477, 404 A.2d at 37. The court asserted that the purpose of the
reciprocal discovery provision is to inform the State in advance of the
evidence a defendant intends to use at trial. In this case, however,
since the information was damaging to the defense, Williams' attorney
obviously did not intend to introduce the material at trial. Id.
Justice Sullivan stated that a contrary holding would violate
defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, "because of the chilling effect it would have on defense investigation."
He reasoned that defense attorneys might hesitate to thoroughly investigate and prepare a defense for fear that inculpatory material
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which they uncovered would have to be turned over to the prosecution. Inhibiting attorneys in this fashion would reduce their effectiveness. Id. at 478-79, 404 A.2d at 37-38.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Schreiber averred that the
criminal discovery rules were designed to aid the presentation of all
relevant evidence to the jury. He.favored a broad interpretation of
the reciprocal discovery rule "as an aid to truth and justice." Furthermore, Justice Schreiber noted that the discovery rule in question
is not activated until after the defendant first seeks discovery. Id. at
483, 404 A.2d at 40.
The majority opinion in Williams extended the ruling of State v.
Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978). Mingo concerned an inculpatory report by a defense-retained handwriting expert. Even though
the defense obviously did not intend to use the report, the State
compelled discovery. The supreme court ruled, however, that the
discovery rule did not mandate disclosure of the report. The court
affirmed the defense attorney's right to seek expert opinion, without
fear of disclosure to the State should the expert evidence prove to be
unfavorable. Where Mingo was limited to "reports of opinions of expert witnesses," id. at 585, 392 A.2d at 594, Williams extended the
holding to allow discovery of written statements or memoranda reporting oral statements of potential State witnesses only when the
defense plans to use these statements at trial. 80 N.J. at 482, 404
A.2d at 38 (1979).
The Williams decision marks a limitation on the philosophy of
broad discovery. The court weighed the goal of presenting the jury
with all relevant material against defendant's constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, and in the facts before it, held the
latter to be paramount.
FIRE INSURANCE-INSURER

JUSTIFIED IN REJECTING UNTIMELY

REPORT OF INVENTORY FILED PURSUANT TO VALUE REPORTING

CLAUSE-Watchung Pool Supplies, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 169 N.J. Super. 474, 404 A.2d 1281 (Law Div. 1979).
Watchung Pool Supplies, Inc. (Watchung) operated several stores
in New Jersey that sold and serviced swimming pools and accessory
supplies. On July 7, 1977, Watchung's East Hanover warehouse and
contents, insured by Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Aetna), were destroyed by fire. The original insurance policy on the destroyed
warehouse provided for $50,000 of coverage for the building, and
maximum coverage of $100,000 for the contents thereof. This policy
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was modified by a value reporting clause which was the subject of
this declaratory judgment action. 169 N.J. Super. at 476-77, 404 A.2d
at 1282.
An explanation of value reporting insurance was given by Judge
MacKenzie in his opinion. In this type of insurance, the amount of
coverage changes as the inventory level fluctuates, the practical effect
being that the insured pays premiums proportionate to his inventory
level. Id. at 479, 404 A.2d at 1283. The insured pays an initial provisional premium based upon an estimate of the maximum amount of
reportable property that will need insurance at any time. This estimate becomes the limit of liability. In the succeeding months, the
insured sends in monthly inventory reports. At the end of the coverage period, the monthly reports are totalled and divided by the
number of months in the term. This figure represents the actual insurable amount for which the insured must pay a premium. An additional premium or a refund is then computed. Id. at 480, 404 A.2d at
1283-84.
The monthly reports in the instant case were to be filed "not
later than 30 days after the last day of each calendar month." Id. at
481, 404 A.2d at 1284 (emphasis deleted). The fire occurred on July
7, but the monthly reports for May and June were not filed until July
13. These reports stated the inventory value as $100,000 which was
the maximum value allowed. Id. at 478, 404 A.2d at 1282-83.
Although Aetna determined that the value of the inventory was
indeed $100,000 at the time of the fire, it only paid Watchung
$65,503, the amount stated in its last report before the fire. Id. Aetna
based this latter amount on the terms of its policy provision that
stated, "[a]t the time of any loss, if the insured has failed to file with
the Company reports of values as above required, this policy ...
shall cover only . . . the amounts included in the last report of values
filed prior to the loss .... ." Id. at 481, 404 A.2d at 1285 (emphasis
deleted). Aetna argued that the above provision should have been
interpreted to mean that the report filed prior to the loss determined
the coverage at the time of the fire. Watchung urged that although
the report for June was filed after the fire, it was filed within the
thirty-day grace period and was, therefore, valid. Id. at 482, 404 A.2d
at 1285.
Judge MacKenzie found that Aetna's position was more tenable
and denied Watchung's motion for summary judgment. The judge
based his holding on prior case law from other jurisdictions and stated
that holding for the insured in such cases "would subject insurers to
the potential of fraudulent claims by insureds who deliberately with-
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hold value reports until after the time of the loss. . . . Allowing the
filing of a report after a loss would permit the insured to enjoy the
lowest possible premium by regularly understating value and then defraud the insurer after a loss by submitting an inflated report .
Id. at 486, 404 A.2d at 1287.
The court, therefore, held that the second sentence of the value
reporting clause, which provided for judging the loss by the value
report filed prior to the loss, was "a separate and superseding policy
provision." Id. It was not unreasonable for an insurer to impose
consequences upon an insured when the insured failed to file its reports on time.
INCOMPETENTS-

STERILIZATION-REVIEW

TO ALLOW PARENTS

TO

CONSENT

INCOMPETENT DAUGHTER-In

OF

STANDARDS

TO STERILIZATION

OF

re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98,

405 A.2d 851 (Ch. Div. 1979).
The parents of Lee Ann Grady, an 18 year-old incompetent
afflicted with Down's Syndrome, sought to have her sterilized by
tubal ligation. They desired to be appointed general guardians upon a
declaration of incompetency so that they could authorize the operation. Their request was refused by Morristown Memorial Hospital
because there was no court authorization. The Gradys filed a complaint seeking this authority. 170 N.J. Super. at 101, 405 A.2d at 852.
Testimony elicited from Lee Ann's father and two medical experts revealed, inter alia, that Lee Ann suffered from Down's Syndrome and had an intelligence quotient in the upper twenties to
upper thirties; it was unlikely that there would be any significant improvement in her mental, social, and developmental capabilities at
any time in the future; she was expected to have a life expectancy of
normal duration; Lee Ann was then incapable and would most likely
remain incapable of caring for herself and others, including offspring,
and would always be dependent upon others for personal care. She
was incapable of making a reasoned decision concerning procreation
and contraception. Id. at 102, 405 A.2d at 852.
The court initially considered the legal trends in compulsory
sterilization, noting that compulsory sterilization statutes have been
struck down as violative of the guarantees of equal protection. Such
statutes have been subjected to the rigorous strict scrutiny test, and
are usually invalidated. Id. at 109, 405 A.2d at 856-57. The chancery
division recognized that, the right of privacy, guaranteed by the Bill
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of Rights, includes the right to voluntary sterilization. Id. at 110-11,
405 A.2d at 857-58.
With these constitutional principles in mind, the court examined
New Jersey's Developmentally Disabled Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:6D-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). In essence, the statutes
state that individuals who are residents or outpatients of certain institutions can be sterilized only with the consent of court-appointed
guardians if they are incapable of giving informed consent. The court
held that Lee Ann Grady was not subject to the statute's jurisdiction
because she was not a resident or outpatient of an institution. 170
N.J. Super. at 113-14, 405 A.2d at 860.
The chancery division recognized that at one time the only jurisdiction available to a court in this matter was derived from statute.
However, the United States Supreme Court, in Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349 (1978), discredited the position that this was the sole
means of jurisdiction. Adhering to the Supreme Court's decision, the
chancery division noted that a potential equal protection problem
would arise if jurisdiction was unavailable through any means other
than the Developmentally Disabled Rights Act. In essence, institutionalized incompetents would have access to sterilization, but
non-institutionalized incompetents would be denied equal protection
because the statute providing for substituted consent excludes them.
170 N.J. Super. at 118-19, 405 A.2d at 861. As a result of this situation, the court invoked parens patriae jurisdiction to permit them to
consider the parent's right to give informed substituted consent for
their daughter Lee Ann. Id. at 122, 405 A.2d at 861-63.
The majority of the cases in New Jersey involving substituted
consent dealt with "life-saving" treatment. The Public Advocate and
Attorney General argued that the standard to be applied should be
one of "necessity". Id. at 122-23, 405 A.2d at 863-64. The court rejected this standard as too broad, one which would relegate incompetents " 'to the status of second class citizens.' " Id. at 123, 405 A.2d at
864. Therefore, the court held that, "[i]n addition to need, this court
must also consider, when entertaining an application for authorization
to substitute consent, the good faith of the applicants, their interest,
their motives and the weight to be given to their judgment." Id. at
123-24, 405 A.2d at 864.
Consistent with the sanctity of the parent-child relationship, the
decision regarding medical treatment traditionally has been made by
the parents. " 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
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supply nor hinder .... ' " Id. at 124, 405 A.2d at 864, (quoting Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). The court openly stated
that no one would ever know what the incompetent would decide for
herself. Therefore, her parents, who are the ones most concerned for
her well-being, should be allowed to decide what is best. The court
stressed that certain conditions must always be met for substituted
consent to be effective. Most importantly, the individual's incompetency must have no foreseeable termination, and the parents must
have a genuine concern for the child's best interests.
The controversial point in this case is one which will arise in any
judicial determination of incompetency or insanity. It is accepted that
the tests for incompetency are never fool-proof. However, the problems with this deficiency are magnified when the court touches upon
basic constitutional rights, such as the right to privacy. As the court
noted, a case by case adjudication is needed, and this requirement
should be strictly enforced.
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES -

CHARITIESALLOCATION OF
ESTATE TAXES TO RECIPIENTS OF CHARITABLE GIFTS-In re

Estate of Rankin, 169 N.J. Super. 317, 404 A.2d 1200 (App. Div.
1979).
Catherine Rankin's will was admitted to probate on June 14,
1976, and letters testamentary were issued to the Howard Savings
Bank as executor. After deducting non-probate assets, specifically bequeathed tangible personal property; other probate assets, debts, and
administration expenses, there was a distributal residue before estate
and inheritance taxes of $310,749. 169 N.J. Super. at 319, 404 A.2d
at 1201. Article Seventh of the will provided that the residue was to
be divided into three equal shares. Cancer Research Institute, Inc.,
and several other charities were given one-third of the residue; the
other two-thirds were divided among relatives and friends. Article
Second of the will, in essence, provided that taxes on preresiduary or
non-probate assets were to be paid from the residue of decedent's
probate estate rather than be charged against those respective assets.
However, it was silent regarding whether the estate and inheritance
taxes were to be calculated before or after division of the residue into
the three shares. Id. at 319-20, 404 A.2d at 1202.
The executor's account contended that all estate and inheritance
taxes should be deducted from the residue before the distribution of
the charities' one-third share. The trial court accepted this interpretation, attempting to divine that the intent of the testator was to force
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the charities to bear their share of the taxes of the residuary estate.
This resulted in a decrease in the charities' share of the residue, and
an increase in the total estate tax liability. Id. at 323-24, 404 A.2d at
1202.
At the appellate division, the appellants, Cancer Research Institute, Inc., contended, "that because the will [was] silent as to the
apportionment of taxes between the charities and the individual residuary legatees within the residue, no part of the taxes generated by
the individuals' shares of the residue should be borne by them." Id.
at 321, 404 A.2d at 1202.
The appellate division held that the trial court had erred by trying to interpret the testator's intent. They noted that the scrivener of
the will was unable to supply any evidence of her intent. Moreover,
"[a]mple authority holds that a testamentary direction to divide an
estate into equal shares is an inadequate manifestation that there be
post-tax equality." Id. at 324, 404 A.2d at 1204 (citing Gesner v.
Roberts, 48 N.J. 379, 225 A.2d 697 (1967); In re Burnett, 50
N.J. Super. 482, 142 A.2d 695 (Bergen County Ct. 1958); Case v.
Roebling, 42 N.J. Super. 545, 127 A.2d 409 (Ch. Div. 1956)).
The court's opinion initially examined the overall tax liability of
the estate as a result of the trial court's decision. If Cancer Institute
were charged with a portion of the estate and inheritance taxes attributable to the noncharitable residuary shares, the federal estate
tax charitable deduction would be decreased. The tax liability as a
whole would be greater, even though the individual legatee's liability
would decrease. This conflicted with the presumption in New Jersey
that the testator intends maximum tax advantage for his estate. 169
N.J. Super. at 327, 404 A.2d at 1205.
The court also examined public policy, which supports the notion
that a gift which lessens tax as a whole should not be made to bear a
portion of the tax attributable to other parts of the estate. In addition,
the court stressed that there is a legislative purpose encouraging
charitable deductions. Therefore, increasing the attractiveness of
these gifts is a valid concern. Id. Finally, the court held that this is
the only equitable outcome, in the absence of testamentary intent or
statutory authority to the contrary, because charitable gifts do not
generate, but tend to lessen the tax burden. Id. at 327-28, 404 A.2d
at 1206.
The decision by the appellate division is based on equitable
theories which are supported by the case law. See In re Estate of
Marks, 129 N.J. Super. 276, 322 A.2d 860 (Hudson County Ct.
1974), affd o.b., 134 N.J. Super. 510, 342 A.2d 225 (App. Div.
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1975), certif. denied, 68 N.J. 280, 344 A.2d 314 (1975). As the decision pointed out, allowing charitable organizations to benefit through
tax laws encourages this type of testamentary gift. This equitable doctrine will be invoked unless a contrary testamentary intent is evidenced.
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Travelers Insurance Co. v. Collella, 169 N.J. Super. 412, 404
A.2d 1250 (App. Div. 1979).
Gennaro Collella, an employee of the North American Phillips
Company (Phillips), was injured in an automobile accident that involved his car and a Willingboro Township police car. Phillips was
insured by the plaintiff, Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers),
which paid workers' compensation benefits to Collella for medical expenses and temporary compensation in the amount of $5,202.45. 169
N.J. Super. at 414, 404 A.2d at 1250-51.
Collella subsequently instituted an action against Willingboro
Township and the police officer involved in the accident. A jury
awarded Collella $30,698.37 in damages. Id. at 414, 404 A.2d at
1251. Travelers then sued Collella for reimbursement of the amount
paid out in workers' compensation. In the trial court, Traveler's motion for summary judgment was granted and Collella was ordered to
reimburse Travelers. Id.
Travelers proceeded under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40(b) (West
1959) which provides for the reimbursement of insurers if the
employee recovers from other sources. Travelers argued that if" 'the
sum recovered by the employee . . . is equivalent to or greater than
the liability of the employer or his insurance carrier,' " reimbursement is appropriate. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40(b)
(West 1959)).
Collella argued that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2(e) (West 1979)
precluded the recovery by Collella of the compensation that Travelers
sought. That statute disallows recoveries from public entities for benefits also paid by workers' compensation. Collella argued, therefore,
that Travelers was precluded from subrogation. 169 N.J. Super. at
414, 404 A.2d at 1251. Travelers responded by asserting that N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:1-5 (1979) negatived the effect of § 59:9-2(e) because
of its nonrepealer provision. New Jersey Statutes Annotated section
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59:1-5 states that nothing in Title 59 will affect, alter, or repeal any
provision in Title 34, the workers' compensation laws.
The statutes, therefore, appeared to be contradictory and the obligation of the court was to "divine .. .the intent of the legislature so
that, in the event they cannot be harmonized, [the court] may declare which shall prevail." 169 N.J. Super. at 414-15, 404 A.2d at
1251.
The court noted that it was impossible for a plaintiff who is covered by workers' compensation benefits to collect identical compensation from a public entity in a common law award. 169 N.J. Super.
at 415, 404 A.2d at 1251. Judge Fritz, writing for the court, realized
that to allow Travelers to collect those benefits "would be to confer
upon'the commercial insurance company rights beyond those the
legislature gave the injured worker." Id. It followed, then, that
Travelers could not be reimbursed for benefits that Collella did not
receive. The court reversed the trial decision and remanded for an
entry of judgment for Collella.
As noted by the court, the reason for limiting subrogation is to
"'limit the exposure to liability of public entities' according to the
appended comment-1972." Id. at 415, 404 A.2d at 1252. To allow
subrogation would be to ignore legislative intent. Judge Fritz also
disposed of the nonrepealer argument made by Travelers by stating
"[w]e are satisfied the purpose of this very general statute was simply
to preserve the direct obligation which a public entity might have to
its employees under the worker's compensation statutes." Id. (emphasis in original).
The court, therefore, found that there were no contradictions in
the statutes. Section 59:1-5 guarantees workers' compensation benefits to public employees, while section 59:9-2(e) prohibits subrogation or collection of benefits, or both, from public entities when the
benefits have already been supplied by an insurer. Section 34:1540(b) clearly allows insurance companies to recover workers' compensation benefits that they have paid out. The insurance company does
not, however, have subrogation rights when the defendant is a public
entity because the insured cannot recover these elements of damages
from that entity.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
TITLE INSURANCE-REASONABLE
APPLIED

TO INCORPORATE

EXPECTATION

SURVEY

OF LAND

[Vol. 10:747
DOCTRINE
INTO TITLE

POLICY-MacBean v. St. Paul Title Insurance Corp.,
169 N.J. Super. 502, 405 A.2d 405 (App. Div. 1979).

INSURANCE

In April, 1973, plaintiffs Scott and Katherine MacBean contracted to purchase a home in the Township of Dover for $24,000.
169 N.J. Super. at 503, 405 A.2d at 406. A survey of the property,
conducted by licensed land surveyors on behalf of the plaintiffs, indicated that Delaware Avenue, a public street, abutted the property
and was the border upon which the home fronted. It was undisputed
that Delaware Avenue was intended to be used by the plaintiffs for
entrance and exit to the front of their residence by both a walkway
and a driveway. The portion of Delaware Avenue which abutted the
entire frontage of the property and terminated at the westerly property line was unpaved and uncurbed. Id. at 504, 405 A.2d at 406.
The property was thus located at the southwestern corner of what was
essentially an incomplete intersection. Id. at 504, 405 A.2d at 407.
At the time of the closing, the defendant insurance company issued to the plaintiffs a title insurance policy. The printed form policy
contained language which excluded the survey conducted on behalf of
the plaintiffs. However, this standard exclusion from coverage was
expressly omitted by a typewritten addendum to the policy. Immediately following this item, another typewritten provision was set
forth which indicated that the survey made by the plaintiffs' surveyors, Clymer and Associates, "show[ed] clear." The survey was
thereby incorporated by reference into the title policy. Id. at 505,
405 A.2d at 407.
In October 1975, the plaintiffs were advised by the Dover Township Engineer that the portion of Delaware Avenue which abutted
the frontage of their property was not a public street but a privately
owned lot. Subsequently, a one-family residence was built on the
portion of purported Delaware Avenue which was directly in front of
plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs alleged that the newly constructed
residence substantially curtailed their free access to the front of their
property and thereby diminished its value. Id. at 505-06, 405 A.2d at
407.
After plaintiffs failed to obtain satisfaction from the surveyors,
they instituted suit against the title insurance carrier. The trial judge
granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on the grounds that the policy insured the survey, including the representation that the portion
of Delaware Avenue which abutted on plaintiffs' property was a pub-
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lic street. Defendant insurance company appealed the grant of summary judgment on the issue of liability. Id. at 506, 405 A.2d at 407.
The appellate division, in an opinion by Judge King, viewed the
case from the perspective of a claim under an insurance policy rather
-than that of a real property dispute. Reading the insurance policy in
its entirety, the court concluded that "the fair expectation of the
purchaser of the insurance would be that item 8 constitutes an affirmative insuring agreement that the Clymer survey 'show[ed] clear.' "
Id. at 507, 405 A.2d at 408. The court therefore rejected the defendant's contention that typewritten addendum 8 was an item of
exclusion rather than inclusion. The court viewed the issue of the
insurance company's liability as being governed by "the reasonable
expectation of an average lay purchaser of insurance." In order to
look to this standard, the court must first find, as a matter of fact,
that the insurance policy, either as drafted or as applicable, was ambiguous. In the present case, the court concluded that the policy as
drafted with the typewritten addendum was ambiguous. Id.
According to the court, whether the plaintiffs could reasonably
expect that their title policy insured the accuracy of the survey was a
question of fact. The court held that the policy was ambiguous "as to
the extent to which the contents of the survey were insured and that
the availability of coverage is thus to be determined by the trier of
fact applying the reasonable expectation doctrine." Id. at 508, 405
A.2d at 408.
The court followed the "reasonable expectation" doctrine as expressed by the New Jersey supreme court in Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961). The Kievit
court had held that members of the public who purchased insurance
policies are entitled to " 'the broad measure of protection necessary
to fulfill their reasonable expectations.' " 169 N.J. Super. at 508, 405
A.2d at 408 (quoting Kievet v. Loyal Protective Insurance Co., 34
N.J. at 492, 170 A.2d at 32). Such policies should be liberally construed in favor of the purchaser and should not be " 'subjected to
technical emcumbrances or to hidden pitfalls.' " 169 N.J. Super. at
508, 405 A.2d at 408. In addition, the court noted that the reasonable
expectation doctrine has been specifically applied to title insurance
policies. Judge King reiterated that the reasonable expectation principle applies only when an ambiguity arises. Id. at 508, 405 A.2d at
409.
Therefore, "[i]n the absence of a clear, precise description of its
undertaking in respect of the insured survey, the carrier is subject to
the 'reasonable expectations' doctrine developed by the above-cited
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cases." Id. at 509, 405 A.2d at 409. The issue of the carrier's liability
under the reasonable expectation doctrine was for the trier of fact.
The court concluded that under these circumstances the finder of fact
"could fairly conclude that a reasonable purchaser of insurance would
understand that a survey, described in the policy as 'showing clear,'
and indicating a street abutting one of the boundary lines of his property, had been certified to him by the insurer as a dedicated public
street." Id.
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Township Zoning Board v. Evesham Township Council, 169 N.J.
Super. 460, 404 A.2d 1274 (Law Div. 1979).
The Ruggierios purchased a building in an area of Evesham
Township zoned solely for residential use. Since they desired to use
the building as an office, they applied to the Evesham Zoning Board
of Adjustment for a use variance. The Board denied the variance request after a public hearing and defendants then appealed to the governing body of Evesham, pursuant to their statutory right. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40:55D-17 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). The Township
Council reversed the Board and granted the variance. The Board
then sued the Council, "alleging that the council's action was arbitrary, capricious, and a usurpation of the authority entrusted exclusively to the board by the Municipal Land Use Law." 169 N.J.
Super. at 463, 404 A.2d at 1276.
Under the Municipal Land Use Law, a board of adjustment may
grant a variance "unless the grant of such a variance would do substantial detriment to the public good or substantially impair the intent
and purpose of the municipality's zoning scheme." The governing
body, in considering an appeal, may examine only the record before
the board of adjustment. Id. at 464, 404 A.2d at 1276.
The New Jersey superior court, law division, reversed the decision of the Township Council. The court held that a governing body
may reverse a board of adjustment only where the board acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner. In this case, the board of adjustment's decision was well-supported and "was by no means arbitrary."
Id. at 474, 404 A.2d at 1281. In so holding, the court clarified the
standard of review to be employed by governing bodies in deciding
appeals. Because the Municipal Land Use Law was silent as to this
question, in arriving at its decision, the court relied heavily upon the
intent of the legislature. Id. at 465, 404 A.2d at 1276.

1980]

SURVEY

The Township argued that the applicable standard should be that
used under the old statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.19 (West
1967), which allowed persons aggrieved by planning board decisions a
right of appeal to the governing body. However, in such cases, the
governing body's inquiry was not restricted to the record below.
Hence, the governing body did not act as an appellate body. Instead,
it offered aggrieved parties a hearing de novo. Id. at 468, 404 A.2d at
1278.
The law division disagreed with the Township's conclusion. The
court found a legislative intention that the new law strengthen the
role of planning boards. Under the new statute, all planning boards
are "strong"; their decisions are final without municipal body action.
The court emphasized that the legislature eliminated de novo appeal
from planning board decisions and replaced it with a review of the
record below. Id. at 467, 404 A.2d at 1277. The court saw these
changes as evincing legislative intent to sharply delineate the functions of planning boards and governing bodies. Id. at 469, 404 A.2d at
1279.
The law division concluded that a governing body may reverse or
modify board of adjustment final decisions only if it finds the board's
decision to be "so arbitrary or capricious that it amounted to an abuse
of discretion...." Any other standard would weaken boards of adjustment, cause overlap of municipal bodies' functions, and deny finality to board of adjustment decisions, contrary to legislative intent.
Id. at 471, 404 A.2d at 1279-80.
The Evesham decision delineates the authority vested in boards
of adjustment. As municipal planning has become more complex, a
need has arisen for added clarity in the law so that the planning process can proceed expeditiously. The Evesham court recognized this
reality and the decision of the court can be expected to facilitate land
use planning in the future.
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POWER-Home Builders League of South Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381 (1979).

Four municipalities in Camden County enacted zoning ordinances containing minimum floor area requirements for residences.
These standards, varying between each residential zone, were
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adopted without regard to intensity of use, frontage, or lot size. The
Home Builders League of South Jersey, Inc. (League), is a non-profit
corporation whose membership was engaged in various aspects of the
construction industry. Together with three individual builders, the
League brought suit against the municipalities in an effort to have
those minimum standards invalidated. The New Jersey Public Advocate, in conjunction with a number of public interest organizations,
intervened on behalf of the builders. The trial court heard expert
testimony as to the needs of minimum amounts of space for health
and safety reasons, and testimony indicating a lack of detrimental effects upon property values where a small home is constructed in a
predominantly large-residence neighborhood. The lower court held
that " 'nonoccupancy based' " minimum floor area standards were not
related to the traditional goals of zoning, and were, therefore, invalid.
157 N.J. Super. 586, 385 A.2d 295 (Law Div. 1978).
One of the municipalities, Voorhees Township, filed an appeal,
but before argument was heard in the appellate division, the New
Jersey supreme court granted direct certification. 77 N.J. 503, 391
A.2d 482 (1978). In an opinion authored by Justice Schreiber, the
supreme court unanimously affirmed the holding of the trial court. In
so doing, it interpreted the recently enacted Municipal Land Use
Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-65(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980),
and adopted a balancing approach test to determine the validity of
minimum floor area requirements.
Initially, the opinion addressed the municipality's contention that
the plaintiffs lacked standing. Relying upon the " 'sufficient stake and
real adverseness' " standard as established in Crescent Park Tenants
Association v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d 433 (1971),
Justice Schreiber held that the Public Advocate and the League had
standing. 81 N.J. at 133-35, 405 A.2d at 384-85.
Turning to the question of the validity of non-occupancy based
minimum floor area requirements, the court weighed the "salutary
and detrimental effects" of the ordinances, and reached the conclusion that the challenged ordinances were indeed invalid. Justice
Schreiber distinguished between statutory and constitutional requirements of zoning provisions. Initially, there must be statutory authorization of the particular municipal ordinance. Once found, the
provisions of the zoning ordinance are presumed valid, and a broad
and liberal construction of the law will be utilized. Id. at 137, 405
A.2d at 387. However, since zoning ordinances are an exercise of
police power, they are subject to the constitutional constraints of due
process. The "means used to attain the ends must be reasonably re-
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lated to those ends." Id. at 138, 405 A.2d at 387. A zoning ordinance
must therefore promote the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare, and an enactment to the contrary is invalid. Id. (citing
Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)).
The court held that where a municipal zoning provision regarding minimum floor areas is enacted, which "on its face [is] unrelated
to any other factor," it carries a presumption of improper motive. 81
N.J. at 142, 405 A.2d at 389. At this point, "the court must weigh
and balance . . . the exclusionary and salutary effects of the provision." Id.
The municipality advanced two reasons to support the minimum
requirements: promotion of public health and safety, and the maintenance of the aesthetics and the property values in residential zones.
With respect to the former, the court held the requirements did not
further public health or safety, as there was no nexus between these
minima and occupancy. Id. at 142-44, 405 A.2d at 389-90. As to the
latter contention, the supreme court differed with the trial judge and
held that even though "the phrase 'conserving the value of property'
does not appear in the existing statute, [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D62(a)] . . .the legislature did not intend to deny the legitimacy of that
consideration." Id. at 145, 405 A.2d at 391. Contrasting the expert
testimony presented below with the widely criticized decision in
Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d
693 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 919 (1953), the court held that the
detrimental effect of excluding low and middle income families
greatly outweighed the salutary effect of maintaining the character of
the neighborhood and the preservation of property values. 81 N.J. at
148, 405 A.2d at 392-93.
The basic inference to be drawn from this case is that a municipality may no longer rely on the Wayne Township case to arbitrarily
set forth minimum floor area requirements in its zoning ordinances.
The New Jersey supreme court appears to have mandated a logical
connection between these zoning requirements and occupancy. Absent this connection, the requirements are presumed invalid, and the
burden shifts to the municipality to prove a furtherance of proper
zoning purposes.

